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HOW WOULD THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS DECIDE HOLT V. HOBBS? 
Francesca M. Genova* 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2015, the Supreme Court decided Holt v. Hobbs, which affirmed a prisoner’s 
right under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act1 (RLUIPA) to 
grow a half-inch beard in accordance with his sincerely held Islamic faith.2  This 
case involved weighing the prisoner’s religious interests against the compelling 
governmental interest in prison security.3  The balancing-of-interests framework 
rarely is found in American constitutional jurisprudence, which focuses on drawing 
lines and creating categories.4  Instead, in the United States, this framework is largely 
statutorily created.  Meanwhile, “‘[p]roportionality’ is today accepted as a general 
principle of law by constitutional courts and international tribunals across the 
world[,]”5 such as the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”).6 
Some, like Justice Stephen Breyer, have advocated for a wider use of 
proportionality in the United States.7  The proportionality approach determines 
whether a law is “helpful, necessary, and appropriate” in achieving its intended goal 
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 1 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2012). 
 2 135 S. Ct. 853, 867 (2015). 
 3 Id. at 859. 
 4 Proportionality is used in the Eighth Amendment context.  See e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 
536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002).  Vicki Jackson argues that it is also part of strict scrutiny.  See Vicki C. 
Jackson, Constitutional Law in the Age of Proportionality, 124 YALE L.J. 3094, 3096 (2015). 
 5 Jackson, supra note 4, at 3096. 
 6 See Bernhard Schlink, Proportionality in Constitutional Law: Why Everywhere but Here?, 
22 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 291, 297–98 (2012) (discussing proportionality in the United States 
and other jurisdictions). 
 7 See id.; Robert Barnes, Breyer on the Constitution, WASH. POST (Sept. 19, 2010), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/09/19/AR2010091904342.html. 
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by considering other factors at stake in its application.8  Thus, the RLUIPA balancing 
test provides a point of comparison between U.S. law and the ECtHR’s 
jurisprudence as the Supreme Court contends with the possible application of 
proportionality in future constitutional cases. 
To that end, this Essay inquires: How would the ECtHR decide Holt v. Hobbs, 
given the same evidence provided at the district court level and the reasoning of the 
court of appeals?  Analyzing this case through the ECtHR’s lens will elucidate the 
implications of the proportionality test in American jurisprudence.  To do so, Part I 
will compare the two jurisdictions.  Part II will summarize Holt v. Hobbs.  Part III 
will describe the ECtHR’s relevant recent free exercise jurisprudence.  Part IV will 
discuss how, based on this analysis, the ECtHR could decide Holt v. Hobbs in light 
of its overarching principles.  Finally, the conclusion will show how RLUIPA has 
aligned the Supreme Court’s statutory free exercise jurisprudence with the ECtHR’s 
and will detail some normative concerns that these analytical structures present. 
I.     COMPARISON OF THE ECtHR AND THE SUPREME COURT 
Both the ECtHR and the Supreme Court use balancing tests for certain 
religious freedom issues, although there are some noteworthy differences between 
them.  Most importantly, the source of the religious right differs significantly.  The 
ECtHR’s religious rights protection is based in Article 9 of the European Convention 
of Human Rights,9 which functions like a constitution, while the prisoner’s religious 
rights asserted in Holt v. Hobbs are statutory: there is no constitutional requirement 
for prisons to accommodate prisoners’ religious rights.10  These differences do not 
foreclose analysis, however.  Each court has looked to the other in certain contexts, 
and they are guided by similar concerns.11 
A.   The ECtHR’s General Interpretive Principles 
1.   Article 9 of the European Convention 
The European Convention on Human Rights protects religious freedom under 
Article 9, which states: “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, 
either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his 
religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.”12  While this right 
is not unlimited, it is “subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and 
are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the 
 
 8 Schlink, supra note 6, at 292. 
 9 See Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, art. 9, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Convention]. 
 10 See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).  
 11 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003).  
 12 Convention, supra note 9, at art. 9, § 1.  For an overview of the European Court of Human 
Rights’s structure generally, see Francesca M. Genova, Labor in Faith: A Comparative Analysis of 
Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC Through the European Court of Human Rights’ Religious Employer 
Jurisprudence, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 419 (2014). 
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protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others.”13  These limitations play a crucial role in the ECtHR’s 
jurisprudence. 
2.   The Margin of Appreciation 
Fundamental to the ECtHR’s analysis is the “margin of appreciation” doctrine.  
Since there is “no specific or single model” of government mandated by the 
European Convention on Human Rights, the “margin of appreciation” doctrine 
allows the ECtHR to respect legitimate differences in conceiving, structuring, and 
protecting conventional rights.14  Under this doctrine, the ECtHR gives broad 
deference to individual Member States of the Council of Europe, the organization 
with which it is associated, when there is a lack of consensus among those states 
about the application of a conventional right, and scrutinizes a Member State’s laws 
more closely if its laws are out of line with European consensus.15 
This deference should provide Member States some freedom in approaching 
issues of rights and governance unless a consensus has been formed.  In the context 
of Article 9 rights, however, it can be argued that this doctrine is being “erod[ed]” 
by the ECtHR’s emphasis on neutrality in recent decisions, which narrows the range 
of legitimate approaches to Article 9 rights.16  In the cases analyzed below, the 
“margin of appreciation” plays a fairly significant role.  No similar doctrine governs 
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of a federal statute. 
B.   The Supreme Court’s General Interpretive Principles on Freedom of Religion 
Under the landmark decision Employment Division v. Smith, the Supreme 
Court held that “generally applicable, religion-neutral laws that have the effect of 
burdening a particular religious practice need not be justified by a compelling 
governmental interest,” as they do not violate the First Amendment’s Free Exercise 
Clause.17  It largely overruled the balancing test applied in prior cases,18 which 
consisted of determining whether a law that substantially burdened religious 
exercise was “necessary to further a compelling state interest,”19 on the premise that 
this balancing test would allow a religious believer “to become a law unto himself.”20 
This decision led to Congress’s near-immediate, near-unanimous passing of 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), signed into law by President Bill 
 
 13 Convention, supra note 9, at art. 9, § 2. 
 14 Andrea Pin, (European) Stars or (American) Stripes: Are the European Court of Human 
Rights’ Neutrality and the Supreme Court’s Wall of Separation One and the Same?, 85 ST. JOHN’S 
L. REV. 627, 641 (2011); see also Genova, supra note 12, at 427. 
 15 Genova, supra note 12, at 427–28. 
 16 Id. at 424 n.29. 
 17 494 U.S. 872, 886 n.3 (1990). 
 18 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 
398, 404 (1963). 
 19 Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 859 (2015). 
 20 Smith, 494 U.S. at 885 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1879)). 
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Clinton.21  Its aim was to “provide very broad protection for religious liberty,” and 
restore, and indeed provide greater protection than, the pre-Smith compelling interest 
test.22  RLUIPA,23 enacted later, defined religious exercise to include “any exercise 
of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief”24 
and applied to prisoners’ religious free exercise.25  RLUIPA provides, in relevant 
part, that “[n]o government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious 
exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution . . . even if the burden 
results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates” 
that the burden is “in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest” and “is the 
least restrictive means of furthering that . . . interest.”26  RFRA and RLUIPA have 
provided the Supreme Court with a balancing-of-interests framework, and RLUIPA 
was the subject of the Supreme Court’s analysis in Holt v. Hobbs. 
II.     HOLT V. HOBBS 
A.   Case Background and Summary 
Arkansas inmate Gregory Holt was a devout Muslim who believed that his 
faith prohibits cutting his beard.27  The grooming policy of the Arkansas prison in 
which he was incarcerated prohibited facial hair, only exempting those with 
dermatological problems who were permitted to wear a quarter-inch beard.28  
Although Holt believed that his religion mandates a full beard, he asked for 
permission from the prison to grow a half-inch beard, which he felt was a 
compromise.29  The prison denied his request.30  Holt then filed a complaint in 
federal district court, claiming that the grooming policy violated RLUIPA.31 
At an evidentiary hearing, the Department of Corrections provided three 
reasons for the beard policy: (1) to prevent concealment of contraband in facial hair, 
(2) to hinder prisoners’ ability to change their physical appearance by shaving in 
order to escape or enter restricted prison areas, and (3) to ensure proper monitoring 
 
 21 Peter Steinfels, Clinton Signs Law Protecting Religious Practices, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 
1993), http://www.nytimes.com/1993/11/17/us/clinton-signs-law-protecting-religious-
practices.html?mcubz=1&pagewanted=print; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(2) (2012); Eugene 
Volokh, 1A. What is the Religious Freedom Restoration Act?, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Dec. 2, 2013, 
7:43 AM), http://volokh.com/2013/12/02/1a-religious-freedom-restoration-act/.  The law’s broad 
support may be decreasing.  See, e.g., Louise Melling, ACLU: Why We Can No Longer Support the 
Federal ‘Religious Freedom’ Law, WASH. POST (June 25, 2015), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/congress-should-amend-the-abused-religious-freedom-
restoration-act/2015/06/25/ee6aaa46-19d8-11e5-ab92-c75ae6ab94b5_story.html. 
 22 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2756 (2014). 
 23 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2012). 
 24 Id. § 2000cc-5(7)(A). 
 25 Id. § 2000cc-1. 
 26 Id. § 2000cc-1(a). 
 27 Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 859 (2015). 
 28 Id. at 859, 860. 
 29 Id. at 861. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. 
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of facial hair.32  Each of those three reasons had countervailing weaknesses: the 
Department’s witnesses named no instance where inmates concealed contraband in 
facial hair and conceded that inmates could do so instead in the hair on their heads 
or clothing; no witness explained why taking photos of inmates without a beard, the 
solution adopted by other prisons, would not prevent identity-change issues; and the 
prison already monitored the quarter-inch beards allowed for dermatological 
purposes.33 
B.   The Lower Courts’ Rulings 
The district court ruled in favor of the prison on the grounds that the prison is 
entitled to deference and reasoned that Holt could exercise his religion through 
praying on a prayer rug, observing religious holidays, and maintaining his religious 
diet.34  The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed for substantially the 
same reasons and ultimately concluded that the Department had shown that the 
grooming policy was the “least restrictive means of furthering its compelling 
security interests.”35 
C.   The Supreme Court’s Opinion 
The Supreme Court unanimously held that the Department’s policy violated 
RLUIPA, as it substantially burdened Holt’s undisputed sincerely held religious 
beliefs and was not shown to be the least restrictive means of furthering that 
interest.36 
1.   The “Substantial Burden” Analysis 
The Court easily held that the prison policy was a substantial burden on Holt’s 
free exercise because the prisoner was required to choose between facing 
disciplinary action or following his religious beliefs.37 
The Court asserted that the district court had erred in considering religious 
practice and issues more broadly than is mandated by the substantial burden test.  
First, the district court improperly considered the other opportunities that Holt had 
to worship in holding that his religious exercise was not substantially burdened.38  
Second, the district court should not have considered that the burden to Holt’s 
religious exercise was “slight” because “his religion would ‘credit’ him for 
attempting to follow his religious beliefs.”39  RLUIPA applies to all religious 
exercise even if it is not a strict requirement of the faith.40  Third, the district court 
should have ignored Holt’s testimony that “not all Muslims believe that men must 
 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. at 862, 864, 865, 867. 
 37 Id. at 862. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. 
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grow beards.”41  This belief “is by no means idiosyncratic. . . . But even if it were, 
the protection of RLUIPA . . . is ‘not limited to beliefs which are shared by all of the 
members of a religious sect.’”42  An individual is substantially burdened when 
required to choose between exercising his or her faith and obeying government 
rules.43 
2.   The “Compelling Governmental Interest” Test 
Since Holt’s “sincere exercise of religion [was] being substantially 
burdened,”44 the Supreme Court stressed that RLUIPA requires a “more focused” 
compelling governmental interest—applying to Holt in particular—than the 
“‘broadly formulated’” ones of prison safety and security.45  The Court recognized 
that there is a compelling governmental interest in preventing prisoners from hiding 
contraband and identifying prisoners easily.46 
3.   The “Least Restrictive Means” Prong 
The “least restrictive means” part of the Court’s analysis led it to rule that the 
prison policy was unjustified.47  The Court addressed the two compelling 
governmental interests: (1) preventing the hiding of contraband and (2) identifying 
prisoners easily. 
First, the argument that a half-inch beard created a contraband concern was 
“hard to take seriously.”48  Fairly obviously, the beard could hide only something 
very small, and the prisoner “would have to find a way to prevent the item from 
falling out.”49  Furthermore, since prisoners can have longer hair on their heads, “it 
is hard to see why” they would opt to hide anything in their beards.50  Even accepting 
this premise, however, there were less restrictive means available.  The Department 
already conducted searches of prisoners’ hair and clothing and permitted beards for 
dermatological reasons.51  It failed to offer a compelling reason why these measures 
were insufficient.52 
The Supreme Court also held that the prison’s identification interest could be 
satisfied by the dual photo policy used by other prisons.53  And, the prison did not 
detail why a half-inch beard was problematic when a quarter-inch beard, longer hair 
 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. at 862–63 (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 715–716 (1981)). 
 43 See id. at 862 (“If petitioner contravenes [the Department’s] policy and grows his beard, 
he will face serious disciplinary action.  Because the grooming policy puts petitioner to this choice, 
it substantially burdens his religious exercise.”). 
 44 Id. at 863 (quoting Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2779 (2014)). 
 45 Id. (quoting Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2779). 
 46 Id. at 863, 864. 
 47 Id. at 863–65. 
 48 Id. at 863. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. at 864. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. at 865. 
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on prisoners’ heads, and mustaches did not cause similar concerns.54  While prison 
officials’ expertise should be respected, it was no substitute for “RLUIPA’s rigorous 
standard.  And without a degree of deference that is tantamount to unquestioning 
acceptance, it [was] hard to swallow the argument” that the denial of the half-inch 
beard furthered the Department’s interest.55  Thus, the Court reversed the Eighth 
Circuit’s decision.56 
III.     ECtHR CASES ON RELIGIOUS EXERCISE 
The ECtHR’s religious freedom jurisprudence centers on Article 9 of the 
European Convention.  In its analysis of Article 9, the European Court uses a step-
by-step proportionality framework, first determining whether there has been an 
“interference” with or “limitation” of the applicant’s Article 9 rights,57 then 
examining whether this interference was “prescribed by law”58 for a “legitimate 
aim[]”59 as laid out in Article 9 and was “necessary in a democratic society”60 to 
achieve that legitimate aim. 
This Part will examine each of these steps in the European Court’s current 
caselaw to explicate what this proportionality test means.  The analysis will focus 
on three cases: Poltoratskiy v. Ukraine,61 Eweida v. United Kingdom,62 and S.A.S. v. 
France.63  Each of these cases provides parallels to Holt v. Hobbs.  Poltoratskiy v. 
Ukraine concerns a prisoner who claimed that his Article 9 rights were violated 
when he was unable to see a priest.64  Eweida v. United Kingdom focuses on two 
women who wanted to wear external signs of their faith.65  S.A.S. v. France involves 
France’s general prohibition of burqas and other full-face coverings.66  These cases 
provide insight into how the European Court would rule on Holt v. Hobbs.67 
 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. at 864. 
 56 Id. at 867.  
 57 See, e.g., S.A.S. v. France, App. No. 43835/11, ¶ 110 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2014) (quoting 
Convention, supra note 9, at art. 8, 9). 
 58 Id. ¶ 111 (quoting Convention, supra note 9, at art. 9). 
 59 Id. ¶ 111. 
 60 Id. ¶ 111 (quoting Convention, supra note 9, at art. 8, 9). 
 61 App. No. 38812/97 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2003). 
 62 Apps. No. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10, & 36516/10 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2013). 
 63 App. No. 43835/11. 
 64 App. No. 38812/97 at ¶¶ 163, 164. 
 65 Apps. No. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10, & 36516/10 at ¶ 3. 
 66 App. No. 43835/11 at ¶ 3. 
 67 The analysis will exclude other ECtHR cases concerning external manifestations of 
religion and religious integration, as their value in the prison context would be limited to questions 
of whether there are more complex cultural evaluations undergirding the ECtHR’s decisions.  For 
a discussion of whether the ECtHR’s decisions concerning Muslims show different treatment for 
Islam than other faiths, see MICHAEL D. GOLDHABER, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE EUROPEAN 
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 88–97 (2007). 
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A.   Poltoratskiy v. Ukraine 
Poltoratskiy v. Ukraine shows that prisoners are entitled to Article 9 rights,68 
although caselaw on this subject is limited.  In that case, a prisoner on death row met 
with a priest only once months after his parents sent the government a letter 
requesting that he receive visits with a priest and was denied the ability to meet with 
a priest at any other time.69  The ECtHR did not consider the guidelines preventing 
priests’ visitation to be “law,” as they were internal, unpublished, and unavailable to 
the public.70  The Court held that this situation interfered with the prisoner’s Article 
9 rights.71 
B.   Eweida v. United Kingdom 
In Eweida v. United Kingdom, the ECtHR, in relevant part, considered the 
applications of two women who claimed that their employers violated their Article 
9 rights in prohibiting religious necklaces.72 
1.   Facts and Procedural History 
Nadia Eweida worked for British Airways, a private employer.73  British 
Airways’ uniform policy prohibited visible accessories unless they were 
preapproved by local management.74  Although she previously had concealed her 
cross necklace, Eweida decided to wear it openly.75  Her manager told her that she 
would be sent home unpaid for refusing to comply, so she reluctantly followed the 
policy.76  Later, she decided to display the cross again and was sent home without 
pay.77  British Airways eventually offered her an administrative position that did not 
require a uniform as an accommodation, but she rejected it.78  British Airways, after 
receiving negative publicity, amended its policy to allow visible religious symbols, 
but it did not compensate her for her lost earnings.79  Eweida filed a claim with the 
Employment Tribunal, citing British law and the European Convention.80 
All domestic courts ruled in favor of British Airways.  First, the Employment 
Tribunal rejected her claim because the “visible wearing of a cross was not a 
mandatory requirement of the Christian faith but Ms[.] Eweida’s personal choice[,]” 
 
 68 Poltoratskiy v. Ukraine, App. No. 38812/97, ¶ 167 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2003).  In the United 
States, prisoners have limited constitutional rights.  See Prisoners’ Rights, LEGAL INFO. INST., 
https:// www.law.cornell.edu/wex/prisoners_rights (last visited Mar. 20, 2017). 
 69 Poltoratskiy, App. No. 38812/97 at ¶¶ 21, 33, 49, 75, 165–66. 
 70 Id. ¶ 158. 
 71 Id. ¶ 160. 
 72 Apps. No. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10, & 36516/10, ¶ 3 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2013). 
 73 Id. ¶ 9. 
 74 Id. ¶ 10. 
 75 Id. ¶ 12. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. ¶ 13. 
 80 Id. ¶ 14. 
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and no evidence of a similar complaint existed in British Airways’ 30,000-person 
workforce.81  The Court of Appeal agreed and held that the British Airways rule was 
“a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.”82  It noted that British 
Airways addressed the problem once it had been raised and in the interim offered 
Eweida a position that would have had no public contact.83 
The second petitioner, Shirley Chaplin, worked as a nurse.84  She had worn a 
cross necklace for more than thirty years and believed that removing it would violate 
her faith.85  The hospital’s policy, based on the Department of Health’s guidance, 
prohibited necklaces in hospitals because they create a “risk of injury,” but religious 
accommodation requests could be made with the manager.86  When V-neck tunics 
were introduced for nurses, she requested an accommodation to wear her cross with 
them.87  The hospital denied her request because a patient could pull on the necklace 
and cause harm.88  She then suggested wearing a necklace with a magnetic clasp that 
would immediately open if pulled.89  The hospital also rejected this suggestion, 
reasoning that the cross could come into contact with open wounds after being 
pulled.90  It suggested instead that the cross be clipped to the lanyard she was 
required to wear, which she needed to remove “when performing close clinical 
duties.”91  Chaplin rejected this proposal.92 
She filed a complaint with the Employment Tribunal, which ruled in favor of 
the hospital because the hospital’s position was “based on health and safety rather 
than religious grounds.”93  Furthermore, it maintained that the hospital’s response to 
her request was proportionate.94 
2.   Was There an “Interference” with or “Limitation” on Religious Exercise 
Rights? 
The ECtHR recognized that both women’s Article 9 rights had been limited.95  
It acknowledged, however, that “if a person is able to take steps to circumvent a 
limitation placed on his or her freedom to manifest religion or belief, there is no 
interference with the right under Article 9.”96 
 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. ¶ 16. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. ¶ 19. 
 85 Id. ¶ 18. 
 86 Id. ¶ 19. 
 87 Id. ¶ 20. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. ¶ 21. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. ¶¶ 95, 97. 
 96 Id. ¶ 83.  This concept is different from the United States’s understanding of RLUIPA.  
See supra Section II.C. 
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3.   The Proportionality Analysis: Was this Limitation “Prescribed by Law” for a 
“Legitimate Aim” and “Necessary for a Democratic Society?” 
The ECtHR next determined whether those limitations had a legitimate aim 
and were proportionate to their goals.  First, British Airways’ image-crafting was a 
legitimate aim.97  But the relative importance of the two competing interests—a 
fundamental right on the one hand, and the “wish to project a certain corporate 
image” on the other—were simple to weigh.98  British Airways’ custom of 
accommodating turbans and hijabs, the amendment of its uniform code, and the 
discreet nature of the cross all showed that “the earlier prohibition was not of crucial 
importance.”99  Thus, in Eweida’s case, the British courts’ failure to properly weigh 
her rights against British Airways’ policy violated Article 9.100 
In Chaplin’s case, the ECtHR held that the state action did not violate her 
Article 9 rights.101  The interest weighed against those rights was the “health and 
safety of nurses and patients,” which falls within the scope of Article 9 Section 2’s 
legitimate aims and is “inherently of a greater magnitude” than British Airways’ 
interest.102  Moreover, Chaplin was given a number of accommodation options, 
although she found them insufficient.103  Finally, the ECtHR noted that “hospital 
managers were better placed to make decisions about clinical safety than a court, 
particularly an international court which has heard no direct evidence.”104  
Therefore, her rights were not violated.105 
C.   S.A.S. v. France 
In S.A.S. v. France, the ECtHR held that France’s burqa ban was acceptable 
under Article 9 of the European Convention.106 
1.   Facts and Procedural History 
S.A.S. v. France involved France’s national law prohibiting anyone from 
concealing his or her face in public.107  The French government promulgated this 
ban in response to the growing prevalence of the burqa,108 which was understood as 
a fundamentalist, not religious, symbol that undermined France’s commitment to 
 
 97 Eweida, App. No. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10, & 36516/10 at ¶ 94. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. ¶ 95. 
 101 Id. ¶ 100. 
 102 Id. ¶¶ 98, 99. 
 103 Id. ¶ 98. 
 104 Id. ¶ 99. 
 105 Id. ¶ 110. 
 106 App. No. 43835/11, ¶ 159 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2014). 
 107 Id. ¶ 100. 
 108 Id. ¶ 16. 
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“liberty, equality, [and] fraternity.”109  A Muslim woman brought the issue before 
the ECtHR, claiming that the ban violated her Article 9 rights.110 
2.   Was There an “Interference” with or “Limitation” on Religious Exercise 
Rights? 
The ECtHR addressed the Article 9 claim with language similar to the Supreme 
Court’s in Holt v. Hobbs: “[E]ither she complies with the ban and thus refrains from 
dressing in accordance to her approach to religion; or she refuses to comply and 
faces criminal sanctions.”111  The applicant neither needed “to prove that she is a 
practising Muslim [n]or to show that it is her faith which obliges her to wear the full-
face veil.”112  The ECtHR then turned to its proportionality test to determine whether 
the ban was justified. 
3.   The Proportionality Analysis: Was this Limitation “Prescribed by Law” for a 
“Legitimate Aim” and “Necessary for a Democratic Society?” 
The ECtHR evaluated France’s claims in light of the legitimate aims listed in 
Article 9.  France asserted two of these aims: “public safety” and “respect for the 
minimum set of values of an open and democratic society.”113 
The ECtHR rejected France’s arguments that banning face concealments 
protected the safety of persons and property and prevented identity fraud.114  Like 
the Supreme Court in Holt v. Hobbs, the ECtHR recognized that the requirement to 
“give up completely” an individual’s “manner of manifesting . . . religion or beliefs” 
was too great a burden for this justification;115 France could achieve the same public 
safety goals by “a mere obligation to show [one’s] face and to identify [one]self” 
under particular circumstances.116 
The French government claimed that the burqa ban ensured “respect” for three 
of “the minimum set of values of an open and democratic society”: “[R]espect for 
equality between men and women, respect for human dignity and respect for the 
minimum requirements of life in society.”117  The ECtHR found only one to be 
persuasive.  The Court rejected the sex equality argument because women 
themselves were asserting the right to wear the burqa.118  France’s argument from 
human dignity also failed, as the Court noted that the veil represents France’s 
pluralism, adheres to certain conceptions of decency, and does not harm others’ 
human dignity.119  But the ECtHR accepted that there may be “minimum 
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requirements of life in society” to foster “living together.”120  The Court agreed that 
the inability to see one’s face harms one’s own socialization and “breach[es] the 
right of others to live in a space of socialisation which makes living together 
easier.”121  Finally, a wide margin of appreciation needed to be given to France to 
craft its own policy to promote “living together.”122 
In its decision, the ECtHR gave weight to a concern that the Supreme Court 
rejected under RLUIPA—the ability to practice religion in other ways.  Although 
“the scope of the ban is broad,” it still does not extend to “the freedom to wear in 
public any garment or item of clothing—with or without a religious connotation—
which does not have the effect of concealing the face.”123  The ban is aimed at the 
burqa’s concealment feature, not its religious aspect.124  The ECtHR seemed to imply 
that Muslims’ ability to wear a simple headscarf weighs in favor of France’s ban.  
Hence, the burqa ban remained, even in light of Article 9’s guarantees. 
IV.     HOW WOULD THE ECtHR ANALYZE HOLT V. HOBBS? 
This Part will analyze the ECtHR’s hypothetical response to a Member State 
that asserted the Arkansas prison’s justifications in Holt v. Hobbs.  For this 
hypothetical, the court of appeals would act as the court of last resort in a country 
party to the European Convention and Holt would file a petition with the ECtHR. 
A.   Would the Prison Policy Be an “Interference” with Article 9 Rights? 
The ECtHR likely would hold that the prison’s grooming policy implicates the 
prisoner’s Article 9 rights because the prisoner lacks any alternatives.  The ECtHR’s 
guiding principle—that forcing someone to choose not to practice one aspect of his 
or her faith can in itself be a limitation on his or her free exercise—is similar to 
RLUIPA’s statutory provision: RLUIPA allows any burden on a sincerely held 
religious belief to be evaluated in its own right.125 
Furthermore, as the ECtHR stated in S.A.S. v. France, Article 9, similar to 
RLUIPA, is implicated even if religious exercise is not required by the religion.126  
The ECtHR would acknowledge, either implicitly or explicitly, that Holt’s belief is 
not “idiosyncratic.”  That is similar to the United States’s rule in which a religious 
belief need not be widely shared.127 
B.   Would This Interference Be Proportional? 
The analysis would then move to whether this interference with the Article 9 
right was limited by law for a legitimate aim as necessary in a democratic society. 
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Since the Arkansas prison guidelines are published online,128 unlike the policy 
at issue in Poltoratskiy v. Ukraine,129 the ECtHR’s emphasis on the margin of 
appreciation would regard the regulation as “law.” 
The prison’s emphasis on prison safety and prisoner identification would fall 
under one of Article 9’s “legitimate aims”130 of “public safety.”131  The ECtHR 
would recognize “public safety” broadly but would scrutinize these claims.132  It 
acknowledges that certain governmental organizations are “better placed to make 
decisions about . . . safety than a court.”133  Hence, it might recognize that prisons 
are better equipped to make their own judgments about prison safety. 
Yet, like the Supreme Court, the ECtHR most likely would hold that the 
prison’s greater expertise in running its affairs does not shield it from judgment.  The 
ECtHR declined to defer to France’s assertion of public safety for the burqa ban: 
France’s requirement for women to “give up completely” their manifestation of 
belief was disproportionate to the security aim because “a mere obligation to show 
[one’s] face and to identify” oneself would have sufficed.134  In this case, the prison’s 
refusal to allow Holt to wear a beard when others could wear one for dermatological 
reasons probably would lead the ECtHR to reject the prison’s safety rationale, much 
like the Supreme Court did.  The prison’s denial of a half-inch beard likely would 
be considered disproportionate for the reasons that the Supreme Court emphasized: 
other prisons had adopted a less burdensome policy, and, like the French 
government, the Arkansas prison was unable to articulate why such a system would 
be insufficient.135 
Some factors, however, may weigh in favor of allowing the ban on longer 
beards.  The ECtHR could find it acceptable that the prisoner could practice his faith 
in other ways, just as it indicated that the availability of the headscarf was 
satisfactory in France.  Also, the proportionality test allows the ECtHR to weigh 
broader societal goods in Europe.  As an international body, it can examine pan-
European trends to make a holistic assessment of values.  The ECtHR in S.A.S. v. 
France allowed the ban to be upheld on its original grounds, a fostering of 
community values, which seems less compelling under United States jurisprudence.  
Furthermore, while an individual may be able to move to a country more welcoming 
of his or her religious expression, prisoners lack choice; if the prison harms their 
religious rights, they cannot remedy the situation. 
The ECtHR’s deep scrutiny of the public safety justification, in light of the 
ECtHR’s ultimate holding in favor of the burqa ban, seems to be a mere warning to 
other Member States about the limits of safety rationales.  Because the ECtHR 
recognizes a legitimate margin of appreciation, it may be more willing to assess 
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concerns of safety, which seem more empirical, than problems of culture and 
tradition.  Questions about public safety have a sort of uniformity across Western 
jurisdictions, while questions of culture are more varied.  A country can promote its 
culture more broadly but should not attempt to obscure these cultural decisions under 
the guise of public safety. 
Relatedly, the ECtHR seems to recognize that a State can protect culture 
through fairly coercive means without violating the European Convention.  Social 
cohesion remains a driving consideration at the ECtHR even in the face of religious 
liberty concerns.  In Holt’s case, then, the ECtHR might be more willing to accept 
the prison’s argument if it included fostering internal community and equality of 
treatment, rather than public safety.  The ECtHR seems to recognize an interest in 
similar treatment to create social harmony in a way RLUIPA does not permit.  With 
these considerations, the European Court could rule in favor of the prison. 
CONCLUSION 
The foregoing exercise shows the differences between the ECtHR’s Article 9 
proportionality balancing test and RLUIPA’s burden-shifting framework.  The 
Article 9 test seems distinctly European, with its emphasis on proportionality and 
the margin of appreciation.  The ECtHR’s position as an international organization 
causes it to defer to national decisions and acknowledge the diversity of European 
States.  It refrains from creating easily applicable factor tests, as these tests would 
overstep the ECtHR’s role as an international protector of rights. 
The Supreme Court’s test has the hallmarks of the American common law and 
statutory system: a multipart test, fact-intensive analysis, and fairly bright lines.  The 
Supreme Court has the authority to issue definitive opinions on statutory 
interpretation to create uniform rules throughout the United States.  A clear 
command from the Supreme Court limits the amount of discretion—and therefore 
power—that lower courts have.  The proportionality test’s very benefit in the 
European system of providing deference to domestic courts, letting them retain some 
power over their own affairs, could be a detriment to the Supreme Court’s goal of 
equal application of laws.  Yet, even with these interpretive and factual distinctions, 
this case likely is fairly easy for both Courts.  Currently, there seems to be a harmony 
between the European and American regimes in result, even if not in the 
fundamentality of this right. 
The margin of appreciation doctrine thus gives the ECtHR the flexibility to 
defer more in the future to a country’s own determinations about its own interests.  
Although the ECtHR’s existence is partially to remove questions of rights protection 
from political contingencies, the margin of appreciation allows it to dialogue with 
its Member States and provide greater room for local policy decisions while still 
being fairly insulated from political pressures.  And, since it knows no stare decisis, 
its caselaw can fluctuate rather easily between extremes, and it can reshape its policy 
of adjudication in accordance with its “living instrument” doctrine. 
Finally, the constitutional-statutory distinction shows the values of the 
communities at large.  RLUIPA is a concession for religious believers.  Congress 
has made a policy judgment that protection of religious belief is worthwhile even in 
the face of other neutral laws.  In the State parties to the ECtHR, the religious right 
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is constitutionally fundamental and supplants domestic jurisdictions’ own 
determinations and policy judgments. 
Issues of religious liberty will continue to present themselves in both 
jurisdictions.  Further, the utility of proportionality-style tests in American 
jurisprudence will remain a live issue for years to come.  It remains to be seen 
whether this apparent convergence is a sign of a larger unity or just one point of 
similarity in otherwise disparate approaches. 
 
